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Illusion, namely a mismatch between the objective and perceived properties of an object
present in the environment, is a common feature of visual perception, both in normal and
pathological conditions. This makes illusion a valuable tool with which to explore normal
perception and its impairments. Although still debated, the hypothesis of a modified, and
typically diminished, susceptibility to illusions in schizophrenia patients is supported by a
growing number of studies. The current paper aimed to review how illusions have been
used to explore and reveal the core features of visual perception in schizophrenia from a
psychophysical, neurophysiological and functional point of view. We propose an integration
of these findings into a common hierarchical Bayesian inference framework. The Bayesian
formalism considers perception as the optimal combination between sensory evidence
and prior knowledge, thereby highlighting the interweaving of perceptions and beliefs.
Notably, it offers a holistic and convincing explanation for the perceptual changes observed
in schizophrenia that might be ideally tested using illusory paradigms, as well as potential
paths to explore neural mechanisms. Implications for psychopathology (in terms of positive
symptoms, subjective experience or behavior disruptions) are critically discussed.
Keywords: illusions, schizophrenia, psychosis, visual perception, hallucinations, delusions, Bayesian inference,
predictive coding
INTRODUCTION
Vision has long been considered one of the main routes humans
use to understand the world (Glezer, 1995). However, recent
findings encourage moving beyond this presupposed primacy of
vision over other senses, notably, when looking at the details
of visual misperceptions. Visual arts provide eloquent illustra-
tions of common mistakes made in vision. A first example is
when artists use artifices to mislead perception and induce, for
example, a paradoxical “realistic” feeling of depth or move-
ment. Illusionists also frequently resort to human perceptual
properties in their magic tricks (Martinez-Conde and Macknik,
2007) to the extent that the study of these tricks has become
the object of an original sub-field in cognitive sciences called
“neuro-magic.”
Historically, the first scientific descriptions of misleading
visual effects date back to the late 19th to early 20th cen-
tury. Physiologists, such as Poggendorff, Herman, Müller-
Lyer, Ponzo and Ebbinghaus, noticed that our appreciation
of contrast, size or continuity can be distorted by contex-
tual information (Zölner, 1860; Hermann, 1870; Müller-Lyer,
1889; Ponzo, 1910). Similarly, Necker and, later, Boring and
Rubin described ambiguous figures that could lead to differ-
ent, mutually exclusive interpretations (Necker, 1832; Boring,
1930; Rubin, 1958) (See Figure 1). These visual effects were
named visual illusions (VIs) or optical illusions. Progressively,
VIs assumed a place of increasing importance in the litera-
ture as a fertile, practical and valid way to explore the under-
lying mechanisms of perception in normal or pathological
conditions.
There is a strong tradition of considering as illusory every
image that misleads perception into instability, insolubility,
distortion or fiction (for an example of synthetic classification,
please refer to Table 1). As a consequence, an overview of the lit-
erature reveals that the stimuli traditionally considered as illusory
vary greatly in terms of (a) complexity [from the simple Three
flash illusion (Bowen, 1989) to the more ecological Hollow-mask
illusion (Gregory, 1973)]; (b) the perceptual mechanisms or phys-
iological pathways involved (e.g., contrast vs. motion illusions);
(c) the level of integration required (e.g., contrast detection vs.
bistable perception induced by an ambiguous figure); and (d) the
type of subjective impression that they may induce (e.g., appari-
tion of fictive gray points in the Hermann’s grid vs. distorted size
perception in the Ebbinghaus illusion). Such diversity is actually
consistent with the important difficulty to consensually define
illusions. On a purely theoretical level, authors such as Gregory
(1997a) and Eagleman (2001) noted the pitfall of simply con-
sidering illusions as a gap with reality, a definition that might
correspond to the whole process of perception. In contrast to this
extensive point of view, an excessively restrictive definition would
risk characterizing sub-categories of illusions rather than the gen-
eral perceptual phenomenon. This would consequently impede
any theorization. As a starting point for this review, we opted for
the classical compromise of considering illusions as a systematic
mismatch between the basic response of the sensory organs to a
stimulus (related to its physical properties), and the percept this
object gives rise to. Nevertheless, this working hypothesis urges a
theoretical clarification, which the Bayesian framework will help
us to address in Section Visual Illusions and the Bayesian Theory.
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FIGURE 1 | Main classical illusions. In the Ebbinghaus (A), Ponzo
(B) and Müller-Lyer (C) illusions, same-sized patterns are misevaluated
because of the context. In the Poggendorff illusion (D), the context
disrupts the impression of continuity. Herman’s grid (E) generates
illusory gray points at each intersection of the white lines. The
Boring wife/mother-in-law (F), the Necker Cube (G) and Rubin’s
Maltese Cross (H) are ambiguous figures that result in different
interpretations.
In this perspective, illusions, hallucinations and hallucinosis
are experiences that share the property of being inconsistent with
the actuality of the sensory environment. As such, they all belong
to the category of false percepts. Nevertheless, the present review
is based upon crucial points of the definition in order to distin-
guish illusions from other misperceptions. VIs originate from an
object already present in the environment and occur frequently in
“normal” visual processing, whether naturally induced or inten-
tionally provoked. The vulnerability to VIs does not have any
pathological significance per se, but rather, it can be considered
a common phenomenon. In contrast, hallucinations and hallu-
cinosis consist of perceptions without any sensory substratum.
Hallucinations can occur in a wide range of conditions, from non-
clinical groups to full-blown psychosis. The pathological nature of
these experiences basically depends on the strength of the associ-
ated beliefs and the extent to which they give rise to delusional
interpretations. This point of view posits the existence of a con-
tinuum from total confidence, where the hallucinatory percept is
completely integrated in the subject’s life, to total distrust, where
the false percept is felt as odd and interpreted as abnormal (this
later end of the continuum characterizes hallucinosis).
These particular precisions are important to understand how
the abnormal patterns of illusory perception potentially iden-
tified in patients who suffer from schizophrenia differ from,
but can be linked to, the other false percepts (e.g., halluci-
nations). Schizophrenia is a severe and disabling disorder that
affects approximately 1% of the general population (McGrath
et al., 2008). Although no clear pathophysiological mechanism
has emerged to explain the disease, complex impairments in inte-
grative functions are thought to result from a large-scale dyscon-
nectivity syndrome (Frith and Done, 1988; Friston, 1998, 2005a;
Burns et al., 2003; Liang et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 2009; Schmitt
et al., 2011; Amad et al., 2014). This disturbance would result in
aberrant concept formation, delusions, and hallucinations.
In a recent paper, Silverstein and Kean remind us that
visual sciences have been invested since the 1950’s to improve
insight into the brain functioning of schizophrenia patients
(Silverstein and Keane, 2011). In line with the assumption that
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Table 1 | Gregory’s classification.
Classes Example Description
Ambiguity Information is insufficient to result in a
single interpretation.
Rubin’s figure can be perceived either as
a vase (black) or as two face-to-face
characters (white).
Distortion The visual context induces a distortion in
size, contrast, motion or disposition
appreciation.
In the Café Wall illusion, the lines,
although parallel, appear to be convergent
or divergent.
Paradox The figure appears to be an impossible
object when viewed from a critical
position.
The Penrose triangle introduces a “mise
en abyme,” which makes the figure
implausible.
Fiction The observer perceives visual elements
absent in the figure because of the
context.
The Kanisza square’s contour is
reconstructed by the perceptual system.
The classification of visual illusions (VIs) highlights the difficult problem of criteria
choice. In one of his categorizations, Gregory empirically chose to cluster VIs on
the basis of an analogy between their appearance and the main language errors
(e.g., ambiguity, distortion, paradox and fiction) from which he assumed they
were derived (Gregory, 1997b).
perception is closely interwoven with other high-level functions
(such as belief genesis or reasoning; Fletcher and Frith, 2008), sev-
eral authors have defended the idea that visual perception plays an
important role in the psychopathology of schizophrenia (Butler
and Javitt, 2005), and constitutes a unique way to explore the
underlying mechanisms of reality construction (Silverstein and
Keane, 2011). VIs were an early component of visual research
in schizophrenia (see first referenced studies: Letourneau and
Lavoie, 1973; Letourneau, 1974). More recently, these procedures
have gained a renewed interest, with Dakin et al. (2005) as the
first authors to postulate a decreased susceptibility to illusion in
this disorder. This hypothesis relies on a simple paradigm: the
participants had to compare the contrast of two patches succes-
sively presented. The first patch was isolated or surrounded by a
high-contrast annulus, and the second patch was an isolated ref-
erence patch. By manipulating the reference-contrast, the authors
noticed that the patients who suffered from schizophrenia were
significantly less biased by the surroundings and were thus more
accurate in contrast discrimination compared with the healthy
and psychiatric controls. The capacity of schizophrenia patients
to outperform normal subjects in tasks that involved VIs paved
the way for a new approach to explore perceptual processing in
psychosis. Indeed, it allows controlling for one of the main con-
founding factors in this population, i.e., decreased performances
due to a global cognitive deficit.
In this paper, we review recent VI experiments conducted in
schizophrenia patients, with the aim of explaining how appar-
ently composite findings may offer a holistic comprehension of
visual perception in schizophrenia. Furthermore, we critically dis-
cuss how probabilistic theories of perception (e.g., Bayesian) are
of interest to understand the singular pattern of illusion sensitiv-
ity in schizophrenia. We also demonstrate how the computational
hypotheses of psychosis benefit fromVIs to provide insights in the
genesis of the positive symptoms and in other psychopathological
properties in this disorder.
VISUAL ILLUSIONS: A WAY TO PROBE THE INTEGRITY OF
VISUAL PROCESSING IN SCHIZOPHRENIA?
DISCUSSING THE LIMITS OF THE STRUCTURAL APPROACH
The physiological existence of VIs suggests that deceiving percep-
tion paradoxically requires the integrity of the different subcom-
ponents of the visual system. At first sight, the corollary assump-
tion appears to make sense: one could consider resistance to VIs
as the expression an identifiable, specific and common disruption
that affects the structures visual processing. However, trying to
synthesize the studies that adopted this structural perspective led
to two main limitations.
First, the structural approach conceptualizes the impairments
of visual processing as potentially resulting from dysfunctions of
the brain structures computing low-level sensory information. If
this hypothesis is correct, this would result in poorer experimen-
tal performances of the patients compared with controls. To date,
the findings based on VI paradigms in schizophrenia do not allow
clear-cut conclusions. On the one hand, many authors, follow-
ing Dakin, reported that patients who suffer from schizophrenia
outperform controls in VI experiments. Dakin’s findings were
notably replicated using the same type of context-based illu-
sion paradigms (Uhlhaas et al., 2004; Tadin et al., 2006; Chen
et al., 2008), but were also extended to other VI categories, such
as the Binocular Depth Inversion (Koethe et al., 2009), illusory
motion and motion-induced illusions (Tschacher et al., 2006;
Crawford et al., 2010). On the other hand, some studies evidenced
unchanged, augmented or contrasted patterns of sensitivity to
VIs in schizophrenia. A summary of the main empirical findings
regarding VIs and schizophrenia is provided Table 2. Importantly,
most of the negative or nuanced results referred to surround-
suppression illusions. This paradigm appears exposed to specific
methodological issues and covariates that may be imputed in the
results (see Section A Window Into the Functional Dimension of
Visual Perception). Even if these data should still be interpreted
with caution, the hypothesis of a diminished sensitivity to VIs
in schizophrenia appears to be a most robust finding. From a
methodological point of view, increased performance in patients
cannot be attributed to general task difficulty, a lack of atten-
tion or motivation or to a disease-related global deficit. Rather
than the classical cognitive deficit-model proposed in schizophre-
nia, these findings suggest a perceptual process different in nature
compared to the one observed in the general population.
Second, several authors resorted to the structural approach to
localize the specific disruption hypothetically responsible for the
pattern of sensitivity to VIs observed in schizophrenia. However,
these attempts led to apparent contradictions. This is notably the
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Table 2 | Schizophrenia, pro-psychotic states and VIs: main empirical findings.
Study (year) Condition (sample size) Paradigm Significant findings
STUDIES THAT IDENTIFIED A DECREASED SENSITIVITY TO VIS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA OR PRO-PSYCHOTIC CONDITIONS
Barch et al., 2012 SCZ-T (132) Surround suppression
(contrast discrimination)
The importance of the surround effect in patients was
reduced compared with CTL. The difference did not survive
the integration of the attentional variables into the analysis
Bressan and Kramer,
2013
Non-clinical
population (123)
Surround suppression (size
discrimination)
The size illusion magnitude decreased with
cognitive-perceptual schizotypal traits and magical
ideations. This reduction was entirely mediated by
judgment time
Crawford et al., 2010 SCZ-T (21) Apparent motion The estimated total strength of the illusion was less
important in patients compared with controls
Dakin et al., 2005 SCZ-T (15)
Psychiatric controls (20)
Surround suppression
(contrast discrimination)
The contrast-contrast effect was diminished compared with
both the healthy and psychiatric control groups
Emrich et al., 1997 Volunteers exposed to
9-THC (7), SCZ (12)
Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
Patients were more resistant to the illusion compared with
CTL. For intoxicated volunteers, the strength of the illusion
was negatively correlated with the plasma levels of 9-THC
Keane et al., 2013 SCZ and SCZ-T (30) Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
Patients were less vulnerable to the illusion compared with
CTL. This resistance was positively correlated with the
need for a structured treatment and with positive
symptoms
Koethe et al., 2006 Volunteers exposed to
9-THC (16), FEP (16), IPS
(16)
Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
Vulnerability to the illusion was more important in CTL
compared with the other groups. The 9-THC-induced
psychological manifestations most resembled those of IPS,
with thought disorders being the most prominent symptom
Koethe et al., 2009 SCZ (75), SCZ-T (75), IPS (22),
MDD (35),
BD (22), Alzheimer’s (6)
Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
SCZ, SCZ-T and IPS tended to be less prone to the illusion
compared with CTL. The difference between the other
groups and CTL did not reach significance. There was no
difference between the clinical groups. No relevant
correlation between the illusory effect and psychopathology
was found in any group
Leweke et al., 1999 Volunteers exposed to
9-THC (17)
Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
BDII was strongly reduced after 9-THC administration
Must et al., 2004 SCZ (20) Surround suppression
(Facilitation effect of collinear
flankers)
Collinear flankers had a smaller facilitation effect on
contrast detection in SCZ compared with CTL. No
correlation was found with clinical symptoms
Robol et al., 2013 SCZ and SCZ-T (18) Contour detection +
Surround suppression
The contour detection was poorer and less susceptible to
the influence of the surround effect in patients compared
with CTL. Patients were also less affected by the influence
of distractors in discriminating the orientation of contour
elements. In some conditions, flankers had less influence
on patients who presented with more negative symptoms
Sanders et al., 2013 SCZ and SCZ-T (34) Apparent motion Susceptibility to the illusion was significantly weakened for
patients. The strength of the illusory movement was
inversely correlated with delusional belief conviction scores
Schallmo et al., 2013 SCZ (28), First-degree
relatives of SCZ patients (15)
Contour detection +
Surround suppression
Contour detection was impaired in patients. Context
caused less of a performance decrement in patients
compared with CTL or relatives
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Study (year) Condition (sample size) Paradigm Significant findings
Schmeider et al.,
1996
SCZ (13), patients with
alcohol withdrawal (10),
Sleep-deprived volunteers
(10)
Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
SCZ and sleep-deprived volunteers were significantly less
vulnerable to the illusion compared with CTL
Schneider et al.,
1996
Patients with alcohol
withdrawal (10),
Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
Patients were highly more resistant to the illusion
compared with controls
Schneider et al.,
2002
SCZ-T (10), MDD (10) Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
The SCZ group was significantly less vulnerable to the
illusion compared with both CTL and MDD during the first
week of admission. Before the patients’ discharge, the
difference was not significant. A trend to resist the illusion
was found in the MDD group but did not reach significance.
The strength of the illusion correlated with the Brief
Psychiatric Rating Scale scores
Semple et al., 2003 Chronic cannabis
users (10)
Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
Cannabis users were less prone to the illusion compared
with CTL, irrespective of the time since the last dose (which
suggests the effects of chronic use). No correlation was
found between resistance to the illusion and psychoticism
Silverstein et al.,
2013
FEP (16), SCZ-T (21) Surround suppression (size) At hospital admission, the SCZ group was less biased by
the context compared with the FEP and CTL groups. At
hospital discharge, vulnerability to the illusion was
comparable for the three groups.
Positive, depression and excitement symptoms were
positively correlated with context sensitivity in the SCZ
group
Sternemann et al.,
1997
Sleep-deprived volunteers
(10)
Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
The strength of the illusion was negatively affected by
sleep deprivation
Tadin et al., 2006 SCZ-T (16) Surround suppression
(motion discrimination)
Center-surround interactions were weaker in SCZ-T
compared with CTL. This led to greater performance in
motion discrimination of large high-contrasted stimuli. This
weakening was positively correlated with negative
symptoms
Tschacher et al.,
2006
SCZ-T (34) Motion-induced blindness The scores designed to reflect the strength of the illusion
were higher in CTL compared with SCZ-T.
The scores were positively correlated with positive and
excitement symptoms but negatively correlated with
depression factors
Uhlhaas et al., 2004 Schizotypy (32) Surround suppression (size)
+ contour detection
No impairment in visual context processing was found to
be related to schizotypy overall. A subset of
thought-disordered schizotypal participants demonstrated
diminished performances in contour detection compared
with CTL. No correlation was found between context
processing and the different dimensions of the Schizotypal
Personality Questionnaire
Wang et al., 2013 SCZ (30), BD (13) Binocular Depth Inversion
Illusion
The SCZ group was less vulnerable to the illusion compared
with both the CTL and BD groups (which were not different
from each other). A sub-group analysis suggested that this
resistance was attributable to the 15 patients with the
highest symptoms scores
Yoon et al., 2009 SCZ and SCZ-T (17) Surround suppression
(Contrast discrimination)
The reduction of the surround-suppression found in SCZ
(compared with CTL) was selective for stimulus orientation
(Continued)
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Table 2 | Continued
Study (year) Condition (sample size) Paradigm Significant findings
STUDIES THAT IDENTIFIED UNCHANGED, AUGMENTED OR CONTRASTED PATTERNS OF SENSITIVITY TO VIS IN SCHIZOPHRENIA OR PRO-
PSYCHOTIC CONDITIONS
Chen et al., 2008 SCZ-T (24) Surround suppression
(motion discrimination)
The surround-induced bias was greater in patients
compared with CTL. This was primarily because of a
stronger inhibition, rather than a facilitation, effect
Chen et al., 2011 SCZ-T (33) Spatial frame illusion The illusory effect was greater for patients compared with
CTL in visual, visuomotor and delayed visuomotor
conditions
Kantrowitz et al.,
2009
SCZ-T (38) Surround suppression (size
discrimination and Hermann
grid illusion)
Patients showed different patterns of sensitivity depending
on the illusion: increased for the Müller-Lyer illusion,
unchanged for the Poggendorff illusion and Sander
parallelogram, and decreased for the Ponzo illusion. These
patterns depended on the contrasts of the stimuli
Norton et al., 2008 SCZ-T (28) Three-flash illusion The illusion peaked at a longer inter-stimulus interval in SCZ
compared with CTL. At 100ms, patients’ vulnerability was
decreased. In contrast, for higher intervals, patients
perceived the illusion more frequently. The three-flash
illusion was primarily correlated with the positive and
general subscale of the PANSS
Tibber et al., 2013 SCZ and SCZ-T (24) Surround suppression
(discrimination of contrast,
size, luminance and
orientation)
Compared with CTL, patients were less biased by the
context in their judgment regarding contrast and size but
not luminance and orientation. No correlation was found
with the PANSS scores
Yang et al., 2012 SCZ-T (30) Surround suppression
(discrimination of contrast,
size, luminance, motion and
orientation)
Patients exhibited more accurate (less biased)
performances in contrast detection compared with CTL.
However, the magnitude of the contextual modulation for
luminance, size, orientation and motion was similar in both
groups
Yang et al., 2013 BD (16), SCZ (30) Surround suppression
(discrimination of contrast,
size, luminance, motion and
orientation)
There was no difference in the surround effect influence
between BD, SCZ and CTL groups for any task
SCZ-T, treated schizophrenia; SCZ, untreated schizophrenia or unknown treatment status; FEP, first episode psychosis; IPS, initial prodromal state of psychosis; 9-
THC, 9-Tetrahydrocannabinol; MDD, major depressive disorder; BD, bipolar disorder; CTL, controls; PANSS, positive and negative symptoms scale. The relevant
clinical correlates are in italics.
case when trying to assess, in a hierarchical perspective (from
retina to high cortical areas), whether resistance to illusion is
because of a high or a low-level disruption. For example, Norton
et al. (2008) suggested an impairment of earlier visual process-
ing by resorting to the Three-flash illusion. In this paradigm, a
light pulse quickly presented twice appears as three flashes. The
authors reported the illusion peaked to a longer inter-stimulus
interval when presented to patients with schizophrenia compared
with healthy controls. They argued that this temporal alter-
ation may rely on a faulty sensory-integration within the very
first stages of the visual stream. In contrast, by exposing par-
ticipants to a battery of simple biasing-context illusions, Yang
et al. (2012) and Tibber et al. (2013) found that luminance con-
text processing was similar, whereas the strength of the illusions
was inferior in patients for the other psychophysical parameters
(e.g., contrast, orientation, size or motion). Thus, these authors
hypothesized that the pre-cortical stages of the visual system,
in which luminance is supposed to be processed, were spared,
thereby contradicting Norton’s conclusions.
VIs, although polymorphic, pinpoint the limits of purely
anatomoclinical or linear causal models and underline, in con-
trast, the complexity and specificity of visual perception in
schizophrenia. The data on VIs in schizophrenia patients encour-
age opting for a more functional and translational point of
view.
AWINDOW INTO THE FUNCTIONAL DIMENSION OF VISUAL
PERCEPTION
VIs are an illustration of the perceptual system’s ability to bind
and group visual elements into coherent patterns, which leads
to a meaningful representation. According to Butler et al. (2008)
this phenomenon of perceptual organization can be viewed as
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relying on two main fundamental mechanisms: gain control and
integration, both of which could be impaired in schizophrenia.
Interestingly, studying VIs provides crucial elements for under-
standing these two elementary mechanisms.
Gain control can be defined as an adaptive process by which the
sensory system optimizes information transmission to consider
the visual context. For example, adjusting neural gains can con-
centrate the neuron’s limited dynamical range around the mean
contrast or luminance of the context, thereby ensuring that their
responses do not saturate with luminance or contrast. Gain con-
trol of neural responses is achieved through a combination of
intrinsic neuronal properties, lateral interactions and feedback
modulations (Must et al., 2004).
Although not always labeled as such, many VIs refer to a basic
perceptual phenomenon called the context or surround suppres-
sion effect, which can be conceptualized as a form of gain control.
This effect can be divided into facilitating or misleading effects
when comparing two targets, depending on whether the con-
text biases perception toward or away from the actual difference
between the targets (see Figure 2). Some authors have argued, in
line with the findings that stem from the study of VIs, that the
impairment of gain control is a robust and significant property
of visual processing in schizophrenia, and may even consider it a
core feature of the disorder (Robol et al., 2013; Tibber et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, carefully studying the VI literature encourages us to
adjust and specify this hypothesis.
Despite the fact that the stimuli used in surround suppression
VIs can easily be standardized, heterogeneous findings concerning
FIGURE 2 | An example of a context suppression effect: the
Ebbinghaus illusion. Depending on whether the peripheral circles are
large or small, the central targets appear smaller or larger, respectively.
When comparing two targets, the actual difference (here, left one smaller
compared with right one) (A) appears reduced with the misleading context
(B) or increased with the facilitating context (C).
schizophrenia have been reported in this sub-field (see Table 2).
This noteworthy statement first raises the question of the inter-
pretation of negative findings. Nevertheless, even if a lack of
statistical power is a major cause of concern in neuroscience
and may be imputed for several studies (Button et al., 2013),
some clues suggest that heterogeneous findings in surround sup-
pression may reflect, to a certain extent, the composite aspect
of the underlying functional mechanism. (1) Some studies have
probed surround suppression in different modalities through a
battery of illusions in the same group of patients, thus limit-
ing the methodological disparity. The authors failed to identify
a steady impairment in the context effect across psychophysic
characteristics. Furthermore, they could not reveal a constant
inter-task correlation, which would have revealed a common
uniform mechanism (Kantrowitz et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2012;
Tibber et al., 2013). (2) Some evidence suggests that surround sup-
pression and its impairment depends on several variables, such
as the contrast (previously discussed) and the time of presen-
tation (Calvert and Harris, 1988; Bressan and Kramer, 2013),
which counters an absolute independent process. (3) The sin-
gle phenomenon of contextual effect is not uniform and may
be variously affected in its subcomponents as suggested by
Chen et al. (2008). The authors proposed that context inter-
action impairment in schizophrenia may be better accounted
for by alterations of surround inhibition rather than surround
facilitation.
In complement to gain control, integration supports the visual
system propensity to dynamically bind elements into complex
perceptual constructs suitable for behavior or social skills (such
as reading, face processing, and visual gnosis). From a neu-
rophysiological point of view, integration relies on long-range
projections of neuronal networks that connect superficial and
deeper cortical layers. In VIs, the disruption in visual integration
abilities becomes strikingly apparent when schizophrenia patients
exhibit impaired coordinated visual skills necessary for the illu-
sory effects to occur, such as stereopsis (Schechter et al., 2006).
Recently, Schallmo et al. (2013) highlighted the abnormal inte-
grative dimension of perceptual organization in schizophrenia,
showing that patients’ abilities for contour integration correlated
with their surround suppression sensitivity, while these two illu-
sory phenomena had previously only been shown to be impaired
in isolation.
Unraveling such disruption of perceptual organization in
its most basic mechanisms through VIs elucidates the con-
nections with models that consider psychotic disorders a
widespread deficit in cognitive coordination. However, test-
ing this hypothesis and addressing how the VI literature
may inform and be articulated requires a more quantita-
tive framework, which is susceptible to coherently embrace
all of the above-mentioned findings. Such computational the-
ories should be able to integrate the results obtained in
VIs and contribute new insight into the perceptual processes
affected in schizophrenia. Among these theories, the Bayesian
framework provides a natural framework for formalizing the
interplay of integration, gain control, and feedforward and
feedback processing in VIs in the general population and in
schizophrenia.
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THE COMPUTATIONAL POINT OF VIEW
VISUAL ILLUSIONS AND THE BAYESIAN THEORY
The links between probabilistic theories and perception can be
illustrated by examining a now famous VI example: the Hollow-
mask illusion (readers can find a demonstration of the illusion
on the following website: http://www.echalk.co.uk/amusements/
OpticalIllusions/hollowMask/hollowface.html). In this VI, a face
is presented as depth-inverted as the result of a pseudoscopic pro-
cedure (Binocular depth inversion). Despite this drastic counter-
intuitive modification, healthy subjects still perceive the face as
normally 3D-shaped, according to their knowledge of human
anatomy (Gregory, 1973). This example nicely highlights how
some VIs reveal the otherwise implicit interweaving between
belief and perception by showing how prior expectations can
overtake the actual objective properties of a given stimulus.
Starting from the Helmholtz’s “unconscious inferences” the-
ory (von Helmholtz, 1866), Bayesian models set uncertainty and
belief as the core features of perception by considering sensory
inputs as inherently ambiguous. In this probabilistic framework,
perception is considered to result from optimal inferences con-
cerning the world (see Box 1).
A re-examination, in the light of the Bayesian theory, of the
stimuli that could have been traditionally considered illusory
enables a conceptual refinement. Importantly, resorting to such a
theoretical framework will help to re-delimit what does, and what
does not fit with our definition of VIs.
In the Bayesian framework, the perceptual uncertainty that
characterizes the “misleading” stimuli arises from weak or con-
flicting sensory evidence (Sundareswara and Schrater, 2008;
Gershman et al., 2012), with 2 principal mechanisms.
(1) A significant dissociation between a strong expectation and the
sensory evidence. For example, the Hollow mask results from
an imbalance between lower (the 3D-inverted stimulus) and
Box 1 | Bayesian theories of perception.
The probabilistic approaches to perception consider sensory stimuli as inherently ambiguous. In order to build a coherent representation
of the world, one has to combine uncertain sensory evidence with prior knowledge. Let us imagine that the task is to infer whether or not
there is a tree (as summarized by a random binary variable theta). The Bayes theorem combines:
• The prior: the probability summarizing previous knowledge, before receiving the sensory information. For example, we may be in a
forest, which implies a high prior probability for tree.
• The likelihood: the evidence provided by sensory organs. For example, what would be the probability of the observed retinal image
given the presence of tree.
In order to compute:
• The posterior: the probability of the percept (is there a tree or not?) resulting from combining prior and likelihood.
Bayes theorem: p (θ|x) Posterior
p (θ|x) = p (x|θ) p(θ)
p(x)
= Probability of tree θ given the retinal input x
p (x|θ) Likelihood
= Probability of retinal input x given tree θ
p(θ) Prior probability for tree
= Probability of the parameter θ before any evidence
More generally, the Bayesian framework considers perception as a hierarchical inference process, with more abstract (higher) levels
generating expectations and sending them down the cortical hierarchy (top-down process) toward sensory representation. Meanwhile,
sensory evidence climbs up the hierarchy (bottom-up process) and activates these high levels representations. In this way, top-down
expectations are constantly updated to account for new sensory evidence.
Several simplified framework have been proposed to describe hierarchical inference and relate it to the brain architecture.
• In Predictive Codingmodels, top-down predictions are subtracted from bottom-up inputs at each level of the hierarchy. The resulting
prediction-error constitutes the input to the upper layer. This updates in turn the top-down predictions, which continues until the
prediction errors are minimized. Each prediction error is weighted by an expectation regarding precision. This gain of prediction errors
regulates the strength of the prior compare to sensory evidence, and is thought to be modulated by dopamine.
• The Circular Inference models see the inference process as multi-directional propagation of activity (beliefs) through excitatory
feed-forward and feedback connections. To avoid a catastrophic reverberation of messages up and down the hierarchy (i.e., to avoid
mistaking prior expectation for sensory evidence, or vice-versa), inhibitory loops must compensate excitatory loops in equal propor-
tion, requiring a highly controlled excitatory-to-inhibitory balance. An imbalance will cause circular belief propagation and pathological
inferences.
Importantly, despite conceptual differences, these frameworks are algorithmically similar and may essentially differ in the type of variables
considered (e.g., binary vs. continuous, see Jardri and Deneve, 2013).
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higher (prior knowledge of anatomy) levels of abstraction.
In this case, perception appears associated with a systematic
bias toward prior knowledge. However, rather than a percep-
tual error, this bias is better understood as the consequence of
inferences that optimally combine bottom-up and top-down
information (see Boxes 1, 3), which supports the best adap-
tation in a noisy environment. This corroborates, specifies
and integrates in a theoretical framework the definition of
illusions that we mentioned earlier (dissociation between
the physical properties of the stimulus and the resulting
percept). Importantly, several authors (Geisler and Kersten,
2002; Weiss et al., 2002) suggested that a whole range of illu-
sory percepts, even those that are idiosyncratic in appearance
(such as motion illusions), correspond to what an optimal
Bayesian observer would perceive in similar conditions. This
optimal systematic gap with sensory evidence could then also
account for the illusory effect of figures for which the prior
is not explicit or obvious. For example, the mechanism was
proposed in different terms by Gregory when explaining the
Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 1). According to this author,
the internalized rules of perspective (i.e., prior knowledge)
lead an individual to compute the line flanked with converg-
ing fins as if it were further away. Consequently, the line’s
shorter appearance conflicts with the actual identical size of
the two lines.
(2) Inconclusive sensory evidence. In ambiguous figures, nicely
illustrated by the Necker Cube or Rubin’s vase, perception
switches between two mutually exclusive interpretations, a
phenomenon called bistability. Although Bayesian formalism
can be applied to such ambiguous figures, their inclusion in
the field of visual illusions is more questionable and needs
closer examination (see Box 2).
Note that we do not claim here that all perceptual illusions,
without exceptions, fall in these categories. Rather, we propose a
framework that can be applied to most of the perceptual illusions
considered in this review.
VISUAL ILLUSIONS, BAYES AND PSYCHOTIC SYMPTOMS
A growing field of theoretical and experimental approaches have
related psychotic features, such as hallucinations and delusions,
to a general disruption in the inferential process (Friston, 2005b;
Fletcher and Frith, 2008; Schmack et al., 2013). By relying on the
Bayesian formalism, authors typically impute the positive symp-
toms of schizophrenia to an imbalance in the relative weight or
precision attributed to the prior and sensory evidence, which,
in turn, causes false inferences. However, within this Bayesian
framework, each model brings its own nuances in the way the
system can be affected. The predictions sometimes clash or can
be incompatible with each other. Importantly, any computational
model should be sufficiently quantitative to enable the confirma-
tion or rejection of the hypothesis based on experimental results
and should be biologically plausible in terms of its mechanisms.
Thus, it is important to consider in greater detail the type of
Bayesian models and the possible sources of impairment that lead
to schizophrenia symptoms for each of these approaches.
For example, according to the Predictive Coding model (see
Boxes 1, 3) of hallucinations and delusions, the system is altered
in its metacognitive components, i.e., in the estimates of the
beliefs’ precision rather than in the beliefs’ precision itself (Adams
et al., 2013). From this point of view, a disruption in these esti-
mates results in the allocation of an insufficient or excessive gain
in prediction errors. Notably, delusions, which can be defined
as false and inflexible cognitive beliefs, are thought to originate
from an excessive gain, which indicates attributing too much
confidence to sensory evidence compared with prior beliefs.
Artificially over-trusted, sensory signals become over-salient and
unpredictable. They could be transmitted up the hierarchy, but
no adjustments could fully resolve the aberrancy (Fletcher and
Frith, 2008). Failing to adapt, the only solution for the system
to explain away the erroneous prediction errors and resulting
chaotic sensory signals is to generate aberrant beliefs at the top
of the hierarchy. Because they constitute the only way to make
sense of lower level sensory phenomena, these beliefs would
progressively become inflexible and impervious to contradictory
evidence (Schmack et al., 2013). Thereby, delusions could be
avatars of tenacious prior beliefs secondarily generated by the sys-
tem to restore coherence in the perceptual world (Adams et al.,
2013).
In contrast, the hypotheses that have been proposed for the
emergence of hallucinations in reference to the Predictive Coding
model are not as univocal. As for delusions, some authors related
misperceptions to an inferential disequilibrium that favors sen-
sory evidence. According to this assumption, the emergence of
maladaptive percepts is closely linked to failures in the system
of self-monitoring, i.e., the ability to correctly identify oneself as
the source of one’s own actions and thoughts. When one plans
an action, one predicts its sensory consequences upon an “effer-
ence copy” of this plan sent to the sensory cortical areas. When
the action is achieved, the actual associated sensations are com-
pared with the expectations. If they match (i.e., no prediction
error), the action is labeled as “self-generated,” and the result-
ing sensations are attenuated. Conversely, a disrupted inferential
system may fail to attenuate the sensory consequences of self-
generated acts. Artificially overweighed, the resulting prediction
error would then drive otherwise silent percepts to emerge into
awareness. The only way to account for this unusual experience
is then to misattribute it to an external agent. A key example
is the delusional ideas regarding agency that arise from insuffi-
cient attenuation of the proprioceptive consequences of one’s own
movement (see Section What are the Links With Action Control
and Motor Behavior?). Several authors have also related auditory
hallucinations to an over-saliency of the inner speech (consid-
ered a covert motor action), which is misattributed to an alien
source (McGuire et al., 1995; Allen et al., 2007; Moseley et al.,
2013). However, in opposition to a theory of over salient sen-
sory evidence, some authors have argued that excessively precise
prior expectations, which correspond to a smaller-than-normal
gain for prediction errors, better account for hallucinatory expe-
riences. According to this hypothesis, perception distances itself
from the sensory stimuli and becomes dependent on prior knowl-
edge of the world (Friston, 2005b; Chambon et al., 2011; Schmack
et al., 2013); thus, one would only perceive what one is expecting
to perceive.
Note that the conflict between apparently contradictory
hypotheses (gains of prediction errors larger than normal or
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Box 2 | Do visual illusions comprise ambiguous figures?
A figure can be considered ambiguous when it provides sensory information equally supporting different interpretations. This results in a
phenomenon called bistability : in observers, two mutually exclusive percepts stochastically switch. An archetypal example is the Necker
Cube, which is alternately perceived as if it was viewed from above and from below (see Figure 3A).
Assessing whether ambiguous figures (considered physical stimuli) and their subsequently generated percept are dissociated, i.e.,
whether ambiguous figures fit with the definition of illusions that we propose, requires dissociating two conceptual levels. We will use
the Necker Cube as support for our demonstration.
• On the first level, the brain’s propensity to derive a 3-dimensioned interpretation from a simple pattern of lines can be viewed as
a basic discrepancy between sensation and perception. However, this discrepancy is inherent to the perceptual process, and thus
irrelevant to specifying the ambiguous figure as an illusion.
• The second level refers to the question of whether bistability can be considered an illusory percept that arises from ambiguity. If we
suppose a hypothetical perfectly ambiguous figure, the answer would be negative. Indeed, the information provided by the stimulus
would be only sufficient to support the two equally probable resulting percepts. Thus, the image would equally coincide with the
two interpretations. Nevertheless, if the bistable perception tended to persist despite the introduction of a cue (for example, by
shadowing one corner of the Necker Cube, see Figure 3B), this would create dissociation between the stimulus properties and the
induced percept: an illusion.
FIGURE 3 | Necker Cube. (A) The ambiguity results in the subjective impression of two interpretations switching: the phenomenon of bistability. (B)
The shadow introduces a cue that is supposed to bias perception toward one interpretation. The fact that bistability persists despite the presence of the
cue ensures this cube responds to the definition of a visual illusion, i.e., a dissociation between perception and the physical characteristics of its
support.
smaller than normal, over-trusted prior or over-counted sensory
evidence) has never been fully resolved, which renders the exper-
imental testing of these theories extremely difficult. Finally, the
neurophysiological processes that cause this imbalance remain
unclear.
The Circular Inference model (see Box 1) attempts to over-
come the contradictions by relating psychotic symptoms to a
distributed excitatory-inhibitory imbalance (Jardri and Deneve,
2013). Inference in a hierarchical Bayesian system can be seen
as a propagation of “bottom-up” messages (carrying sensory
information) and “top down messages” (carrying top-down
expectations). Posterior probabilities (and thus, percepts) are
result of combining these two messages. Since long-range con-
nections in the brain are overwhelmingly excitatory, these two
types of messages would be reverberated endlessly through feed-
forward/feedback excitatory loops if they were not controlled, and
kept in check, by the presence of equivalently strong inhibitory
loops. Indeed such balance is tightly maintained in cortical net-
works, and appears to be affected in schizophrenia (O’Donnell,
2011). In their model, Jardri and Denève showed how excita-
tory/inhibitory imbalance renders the system unable to avoid
circular propagation of beliefs: bottom-up sensory evidence
are reverberated back down as if they were prior information
(upward loops), and thus combined with themselves until weak
sensory inputs or meaningless coincidences are attributed to
highly trusted high-level interpretations. Vice versa, prior expec-
tations can generate their own “fake” sensory represents, which
then come back up and reinforce the prior expectations (down-
ward loops), in the absence of any true corroborative sensory
evidence.
Psychotic manifestations can be understood as resulting from
such circular inferences, which cause overconfidence, surinter-
pretations of weak sensory data and dissociations between high-
level and low-level representations. This would be aggravated
by an asymmetric impairment predominantly affecting either
the upward or downward loops. Depending on which loops are
mostly impaired, the model predicts that either sensory informa-
tion or priors will dominate the final percept. This assumption
is in line with the idea that hallucinations and delusions are
two sides of a same coin (Fletcher and Frith, 2008). Even when
facing weak or non-existent sensory evidence, the circular prop-
agation generates strong perceptual beliefs: hallucinations occur
where nothing relevant should have been inferred. In the same
way, circular inference introduces spurious correlations between
sensory (feedforward) and prior (feedback) messages that are
non-existent in the real world. This leads to the learning and
consolidation of “unshakable” (but false) causal relationships,
resulting in delusional belief systems.
The Circular Inference model reconciles two eventualities
that could have appeared to conflict in the Predictive Coding
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Box 3 | Predictive coding and Circular inference.
Predictive coding
Predictive coding applies the Bayes rule while assuming that the prior and the likelihood have a Gaussian distribution. For example, if the
prior has mean θ̂ and variance σ2θ , and if the likelihood has mean x and variance σ
2
x , then the posterior is a Gaussian distribution with mean
x̂ provided by
x̂ = θ̂+ K (x− θ̂) with K = σ2θ
σ2
θ
+ σ2x corresponding to the Kalman gain.
Thus, the percept corresponds to the prior belief, corrected by a prediction error that corresponds to the difference between the sensation
and its top-down prediction. The “salience” (Kalman gain) of the prediction error is a function of prior and sensory reliabilities. In a
hierarchical network, this operation is repeated once for each layer, as schematized below (Figure 4):
FIGURE 4 | Hierarchical inference with Gaussian variables. In this toy example (left part), the inference that corresponds to the hidden cause (x)
could be understood as the probability that the green color that I am observing (sensory evidence, represented by the magenta arrows) is due to
the presence of a leaf, given my knowledge of the existence of a tree (prior expectation, represented by the violet arrows). Blue and yellow lines fit
for the feedback and feedforward connections that enable the inferential process. Green and black circles fit for the controlling inhibitory system.
The right part of the figure represents the probability distribution of each variable and the resulting posterior probability (in red).
Circular inference
To properly compute the probability of perceptual variables, the prior and likelihood must be multiplied only once. In the brain’s hierarchy,
top-down and bottom-up beliefs should be propagated only once in each direction (see figure above). This can be achieved if equally
strong inhibitory loops exist to cancel excitatory feedforward/feedback loops (green and black units). If these inhibitory loops are impaired,
beliefs are propagated multiple times, or, equivalently, the prior and likelihood are multiplied multiple times. The result is illustrated below
(Figure 5):
FIGURE 5 | Circular inference and relationship with predictive coding. If both descending and climbing loops are impaired (A), both sensory
evidence and prior knowledge are reverberated and over counted (multiplication of the pink and violet arrows). In the Predictive coding
framework, this results in an overconfident (narrowing of the posterior distribution) but not biased (unchanged K) inferred belief. In contrast,
when the impairment only affects climbing loops (B), sensory evidence, but not prior knowledge, is reverberated. The prediction error is
emphasized (K is too large), and the inferred belief is biased toward sensory evidence. If, in contrast, the inhibitory disequilibrium disfavors the
descending loops (C), only the prior knowledge is over counted because of its reverberation. The prediction error is then minimized (K is too
small), and the resulting posterior is biased toward expectations. Note that case (B,C), the inferred belief is associated with an excessive
degree of confidence.
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framework: hallucinations may stem from an overweighting of
either prior or sensory evidence. Thus, asymmetrically impairing
the inhibitory loops biases the inferential system in two opposite
ways that both may generate the same aspecific perceptual phe-
nomenon. This raises the interesting challenge of assessing which
one of the two models is the most suitable to account for the
emergence of hallucinations, which may depend on the disease
that is related to these symptoms, and possibly on a subject-
per-subject basis. Regarding schizophrenia, the question is still
not clear. The reference to VIs, however, will help to clarify the
issue. Indeed, a deficit in the control of upward loops (e.g., sen-
sory evidence that reaches a high level representation and is then
misinterpreted as prior knowledge when it is reverberated back
down) would cause an over-confidence in sensory evidence and a
lower susceptibility to perceptual illusions. Vice-versa, a deficit in
the control of downward loops (e.g., prior expectations that acti-
vate lower levels and are misinterpreted as sensory information
when they are reverberated back up the hierarchy) would predict
an over-confidence in the prior knowledge and a higher suscepti-
bility to perceptual illusions. Here we review three lines of relevant
findings.
We previously discussed that schizophrenia might be primarily
associated with a lack of sensitivity to VIs (see Section Discussing
the Limits of the Structural Approach). Several authors have
empirically interpreted this phenomenon as a sign of a reduced
top-down influence in perception. Some representative examples
support this assumption. (1) In context suppression illusions, the
patients, who rely more on the absolute properties of the stim-
ulus, tend to resist the perceptual bias induced by prior belief
influence. (2) Top-down expectations are thought to be primarily
responsible for the Apparent motion illusion, in which two sta-
tionary stimuli alternatively flickering induce an impression of
movement. Resistance to the illusion in schizophrenia patients
was notably attributed to their incapacity to correctly use top-
down processes in this situation (Sanders et al., 2013). (3) The fact
that patients with schizophrenia failed to correct for the inverted
Hollow Mask to a more plausible (or predictable) interpretation
can also be explained by an underweighting of prior knowledge
during perceptual inferences (Schmeider et al., 1996; Schneider
et al., 2002; Koethe et al., 2009).
Aside from these behavioral findings, recent brain-imaging
and electrophysiology studies have complementarily supported
the assumption of an overweighting of sensory evidence in
schizophrenia. In two recent papers, Dima et al. explored the
neural mechanisms involved in the resistance to the Hollow
mask illusion via an event-related functional magnetic resonance
imaging procedure (fMRI; Dima et al., 2009) and an event-
related potential procedure (Dima et al., 2010). Using dynamic
causal modeling (DCM), the authors notably showed a significant
between-group difference in the effective connectivity patterns
measured during the VI task. While a model that places con-
nectivity modulation from the higher-level areas to the primary
visual cortex (i.e., V1) better accounted for healthy control data,
the DCM revealed a reverse pattern in schizophrenia patients
(i.e., the predominance of the feedforward modulation). Overall,
these findings are compatible with the idea of different percep-
tual strategies in individuals with schizophrenia and controls
when trying to minimize strong prediction errors. When fac-
ing a VI (i.e., a complex perceptual task), a tendency toward
a top-down counter-balancing is observed in controls, whereas
patients who suffer from schizophrenia exhibit a strengthening of
the bottom-up processes that prevent them from perceiving the
illusory effect.
Interestingly, using magnetic resonance spectroscopy, Yoon
et al. revealed that patients who suffer from schizophrenia exhib-
ited a reduced GABA concentration in the visual cortex com-
pared with healthy controls (Yoon et al., 2010). Furthermore, the
authors found that this reduction predicted better (less biased)
performances in the surround suppression task by observing that
the lower rates of GABA observed in patients correlated with their
tendency to be more accurate in contrast discrimination despite a
misleading context. More recently, Loon et al. also supported the
contribution of GABA in visual perception by focusing on bista-
bility. With a computational model of the assumed neural under-
lying interactions, the authors first predicted that a higher GABA
concentration in the visual cortex would result in a slowdown
of the perceptual switches. More importantly, the authors then
experimentally confirmed these predictions by observing, after
the systemic administration of a GABAA agonist (lorazepam), a
lengthening of the percept durations and a decrease in the switch
rates (Van Loon et al., 2013). Because GABA transmission reflects
inhibitory neuronal modulations, these findings underpin the
validity of circular probabilistic inference to account for percep-
tual impairments in schizophrenia by experimentally linking its
assumed biological causes (excitatory-to-inhibitory imbalance)
and the behavioral consequences (perceptual performances).
Overall, the heuristic value of VIs now appears clearer.
Studying how patients cope with these simple stimuli provides
access to underlying perceptual processes that could also account
for the emergence of hallucinations and delusions (White and
Shergill, 2012). In the case of schizophrenia, the evidence from
the VI data converges toward the hypothesis of an asymmetrical
belief formation that favors sensory evidence at the expense of
prior knowledge. Among recently proposed models, the circular
inference model appears particularly suitable to coherently link
VIs, hallucinations, and their plausible biological causes. Indeed,
schizophrenia resistance to VIs and susceptibility to hallucina-
tions can be considered to result from the same circular infer-
ential process in an ambiguous environment. This assumption
has strong support in studies that identified negative correla-
tions between illusion susceptibility and the presence of positive
symptoms in healthy (Bressan and Kramer, 2013) and clinical
populations (Keane et al., 2013; Sanders et al., 2013).
Importantly, while VIs provide a privileged access to the visual
hallucinatory modality, readers should note that adult patients
who suffer from schizophrenia are more concerned by auditory
compared with visual hallucinations (Mueser et al., 1990; Blom,
2010). However, a recent review paper examined the clinical,
phenomenological, psychological and physiological properties of
visual hallucinations in schizophrenia compared with the same
symptoms observed in Parkinson disease, Body-Lewy dementia
or the Charles-Bonnet syndrome. The authors reported visual
hallucinations with a substantial point prevalence of 27% (Waters
et al., 2014). Mostly disregarded in the literature that examined
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hallucinations until recently, the visual modality is the subject
of a renewed interest. Furthermore, we hypothesize that the
demonstration we utilized for visual illusions and hallucinations
could easily be transferrable to the auditory perceptual process.
Moreover, this would be an interesting assumption to explore in
future research.
Positive symptoms are not specific to schizophrenia. The
possible occurrence of hallucinations and delusions in various
psychiatric and neurological conditions or even in non-clinical
populations suggests the relevance of a dimensional approach.
Nevertheless, the heuristic value of VIs may open a path toward
a new categorization based on the computational model that
offers the best fit with particular perceptual disruptions. We
effectively illustrated how an overweighting of sensory evidence
may explain both hallucinations and the reduced susceptibility to
VIs in schizophrenia. Interestingly, a trend to resist VIs has also
been identified in autism (Happé, 1996), which suggests that an
imbalance in processing toward sensory evidence could also offer
a coherent and appropriate comprehensive framework for this
developmental disorder (Pellicano and Burr, 2012). In contrast,
some neurological disorders associated with hallucinations may
exhibit an increased tendency to experience VIs. This tendency
is noteworthy in the case of Parkinson’s disease, in which one
quarter of patients suffer from visual hallucinations and visual
misperceptions (Diederich et al., 2009). Even if experimental
validation is required, references to the Circular Inference frame-
work (Jardri and Deneve, 2013) indicate this pattern potentially
results from a reverse asymmetric impairment in the excitatory-
inhibitory balance (i.e., an overweighting of prior information
relative to the sensory evidence, which is caused by an insufficient
inhibitory control of downward loops). This impairment could
explain the concomitant increase in hallucinations and illusions
in Parkinson’s disease (as could the Predictive Coding model).
THEORETICAL AND CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
SCHIZOPHRENIA RESEARCH
WHAT ARE THE LINKS WITH PSYCHOPATHOLOGY?
The resistance to VIs in schizophrenia patients leads to sev-
eral etiopathological implications and may drive several new
experiments. For example, it appears possible to examine the
correlations between this lack of susceptibility and different clin-
ical features. Despite an abundant literature dealing with this
matter, frequent methodological issues (e.g., inter-group compa-
rability) have made the findings difficult to interpret. Three main
approaches may be individualized:
• Examining the potential links between VI sensitivity and symp-
tom severity (primarily using the PANSS scale) first provided
discrepancies in the findings because these scores were com-
puted as covariates. While some authors found no or only
weak relationships between VIs and psychopathology (Koethe
et al., 2006, 2009; Tibber et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2013), other
authors identified an inverse correlation with either positive
(Norton et al., 2008; Keane et al., 2013; Silverstein et al., 2013)
or negative (Tadin et al., 2006; Silverstein et al., 2013) symp-
tom dimensions. To draw valid conclusions, designs specifically
focusing on the clinical correlates of VI insensitivity in clin-
ical populations, with more precise and specific symptom
assessments, appear necessary.
• A second question frequently raised by the resistance to VIs
in schizophrenia is whether this property could be considered
a trait or a state marker of the disorder. Using the Binocular
depth inversion paradigm, Koethe et al. (2009) identified a
significant reduction in VI sensitivity not only in medicated
schizophrenia patients but also in antipsychotic-naïve and pro-
dromal state individuals. Thus, these authors considered their
findings as indicative of a trait or early state characteristic
within the schizophrenia spectrum. However, this assumption
was not confirmed by longitudinal studies. In two experiments
that prospectively assessed how clinical evolution impacts VI
perception, a normalization of sensitivity to illusions was
observed in the schizophrenia groups that received inpatient
treatment, which became comparable to controls (Schneider
et al., 2002; Silverstein et al., 2013). Even if further investiga-
tion is still required, at this point, we have identified stronger
evidence for a state-dependent pattern of VI susceptibility in
psychosis.
• A compelling question derived from previous findings would
be whether resistance to VIs is exclusively related to schizophre-
nia. If so, this would represent an argument for a new noso-
graphic individualization of this condition as a result of a per-
ceptual property, which is easy to assess. In this sense, studies
that directly compared patients who suffered from schizophre-
nia with patients who suffered from bipolar or major depres-
sive disorders found that the latter two groups were normally
sensitive to Binocular depth inversion (Schneider et al., 2002;
Koethe et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2013) and Contrast modulation
(Dakin et al., 2005; Yang et al., 2013), which was significantly
different from the patients with schizophrenia. However, as
previously discussed, in autism, subjects also exhibited a ten-
dency to resist VIs (see Section Visual Illusions, Bayes and
Psychotic Symptoms), which may contradict the specificity of
this pattern. Interestingly, other studies have suggested that
the induction of “pro-psychotic” states in non-clinical popu-
lations, via, for example, acute cannabinoids (Emrich et al.,
1997; Leweke et al., 1999; Koethe et al., 2006), chronic intox-
ication (Semple et al., 2003) or sleep deprivation (Sternemann
et al., 1997), enable to experimentally reduce sensitivity to VIs.
In another experiment that utilized the Ebbinghaus illusion,
Bressan and Kramer recently reported that the VI magnitude
decreased with schizotypal traits in a naïve student popu-
lation (Bressan and Kramer, 2013). Thus, these converging
clues prompt one to refute the idea that resistance to VIs is
a specific perceptual property of schizophrenia and, hence,
an endophenotypic marker for psychosis in general. The pro-
gressive proneness to VIs may be better viewed as related to
the vulnerability to specific clinical dimensions of the disor-
der (e.g., positive symptoms) via a progressive disruption in
the inferential processes that underline perceptions and cog-
nitions. According to this hypothesis, the more weight that is
attributed to sensory evidence (because of a spontaneous or
induced variable disequilibrium in the excitatory-to-inhibitory
balance), the less prone the subject is to VIs, and the more
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vulnerable he will be to delusional beliefs and hallucinations.
Interestingly, the opposite profile of asymmetric circular belief
propagation (selective impairment of upward loops) predicts
opposite (increased) vulnerability to VIs but similar symptoms.
Thus, the possible reverse pattern of dissociation between prior
and sensory evidence leads one to consider the corollary pro-
posal: the more weight that is attributed to prior knowledge,
the more vulnerable the subject is to both VIs and hallucina-
tions. This proposal may account for the gradual increase in
susceptibility to VIs that accompanies the progressive emer-
gence of misperceptions in some psychiatric or neurological
conditions, such as Parkinson’s disease (see also Section Visual
Illusions, Bayes and Psychotic Symptoms).
WHAT ARE THE RELATIONS WITH SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES?
Considering the Circular Inferencemodel, aberrant experiences in
schizophrenia may be understood as an immersion in a world
dominated by sensory evidence, while top-down influences lose
their organizing and structuring potential. When the ambigu-
ity is particularly strong, VIs represent an extreme perceptual
task. As such, their study provides an emphasized insight into the
phenomenology of perception. Although the hypothesis requires
further investigation, we can assume that during the vast majority
of daily life situations, patients resolve the moderate ambiguity of
the environmental stimuli through strong and unambiguous per-
cepts but with weakened links and coherence between perceptual
elements (links typically implicitly driven by prior knowledge).
The perceptual world would then appear as fragmented and
less meaningful (Adams et al., 2013). Hallucinations would only
emerge when facing highly uncertain (and normally irrelevant)
sensory information. Importantly, because the necessity to adapt
to highly ambiguous situations is not permanent, this may also
account for the intermittent nature of hallucinations (Jardri et al.,
2013).
This model may account for the cognitive deficits observed in
schizophrenia, such as the patients’ difficulties in correctly allo-
cating attention and filtering out irrelevant information. This
phenomenon can also be explained by the lack of prior influ-
ence on saliency. The weakening of the downward beliefs blurs the
distinction between relevant and noisy items, which makes them
almost equally surprising.
WHAT ARE THE LINKS WITH ACTION CONTROL AND MOTOR
BEHAVIOR?
The question of whether the highlights provided by VIs help us
understand behavioral features in schizophrenia requires one to
consider both the complex links between perception and action
and the possible common causes for their disturbances. In this
regard, paradigms that test an illusory effect via visuomotor
performances are thought to engage a complex cross-modal coor-
dination and, thus, are of particular interest in schizophrenia
(Pessoa et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011).
Moreover, several lines of evidence suggest that the tendency
to resist illusions observed in schizophrenia is not limited to the
visual modality. Shergill et al., for example, studied the Force
matching illusion, which consists of the systematic underestima-
tion of a self-generated force deployed to match an externally
applied target force (Shergill et al., 2005). In normal conditions,
a system of self-monitoring enables the prediction of the sensory
consequences of one’s motor acts. In Bayesian terms, the predic-
tions, which arise from prior knowledge, regarding the sensory
outcome of one’s own action permit a reduction in the weight
attributed to the matching sensory evidence, and hence, attenu-
ate the perception related to this sensation. The authors indicated
that patients who suffered from schizophrenia weremore accurate
compared with controls when matching the externally applied
force, which revealed a failure in the normal sensory attenuation
mechanism. This finding outstandingly fit with the hypothesis of
a false inferential process overtook by sensory evidence. Brown
et al. (2013) went further in a recent paper by demonstrating how
perception and action were derived from the same Bayes opti-
mal system. Referring to the notion of active inference, the authors
considered movement as a way to actively minimize propriocep-
tive prediction errors. However, this process is conceivable only
if it is combined with a reduction of precision of sensory evi-
dence to avoid conflict between action and perception. Using a
probabilistic generativemodel, the authors predicted that a failure
in attenuating sensory proprioceptive evidence led to the emer-
gence of delusional ideas regarding agency (the ability to correctly
identify oneself as the cause of one’s own actions), as well as
a decreased susceptibility to the Force-matching illusion. These
findings are in accordance with previous experimental reports of
resistance to VIs in schizophrenia but extend this observation to
multisensory perception.
Overall, the Bayesian framework predicts that false inferences,
which are biased by overweighted or insufficiently attenuated sen-
sory evidence, may coherently (1) account for both the visual and
proprioceptive perceptual changes in schizophrenia, (2) closely
link these changes with action, and by extension, behavioral
disruptions, (3) explain the emergence of hallucinations and
delusional beliefs, and (4) provide an heuristic value to the vul-
nerability to illusions, which can be considered an indirect but
valuable access to the global neural processing in this disorder.
CONCLUSION
Under the Bayesian scope, VIs acquire tremendous heuristic value
by providing new insights into the perceptual processes that
underlie misperceptions. The literature that pertains to VIs has
paved the way for new hypotheses regarding psychiatric and
neurological conditions (for example, overcounting of sensory
evidence in schizophrenia vs. prominence of prior knowledge in
Parkinson’s disease). Moreover, through the probabilistic frame-
work, VIs are an indirect but promising approach to understand
several schizophrenia features as coherently emerging from the
same inferential process. The research avenue may benefit from
a more rigorous methodological approach, particularly by resort-
ing to more precise classifications and conceptual definitions.
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